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Globalism, the Nation-State and Nationalism After the Cold War

### **Introduction**

In the years following the Cold War, the predominance of the bipolar ideological rivalry in popular discourse on global affairs has faded away. What has emerged is a new interest in national and sub-national groups. Far from being confined to the ivory towers of academia, nationalism has received political attention perhaps most significantly in the former Soviet sphere of influence. International relations scholars have regularly left the dynamics of nationalism and ethnicity out of discussions of geostrategic relations among key states in the international system. If the demise of communism has truly brought with it the end of history (Fukuyama), such an illiberal ideology as nationalism should likewise be consigned to the dustbin of history.

The following discussion will look at what nationalism is, has it survived the end of the Cold War and whether it varies substantively between developed and developing countries. The political space in which nationalism would be active are not uncontested, competing with forces both above and below. For the former trends towards globalization and regional blocings are present. While division into smaller sites of primary political identification also compete for loyalty.

### Globalization

Globalization is a process concerned with the harmonization of an integrated world economy, emerging social movements and developing political structures. This process is aided by advances in telecommunications and transportation technology and conceptually challenges

the existing state system emphasized by the predominant academic inquiry. The process does contain a paradox: integrating economic forces in contrast to devolutionary political movements, a universal economy emerges with individualistic political identities. The processes at the heart of the globalization of the world economy are driven by the spread of instant global telecommunications, the rapid growth in transnational intrafirm trade, expansion of global capital markets and liberalization of trade and monetary regimes and institutions. These processes have increased the structural differentiation of goods and other assets (Cerny 596). State deregulation and divestment has gradually afforded the possibility of stateless economic actors. This is the liberal dream: barrier-free trade in inputs to production permitting rational actors to maximize their respective welfare in the Smithian sense of the term. Globalization threatens to promote objectives not in the short-term strategic interest of state governments. The key implication is the undermining of the nation-state and removal of economic decision-making from the national-group-controlled institutions which have predominated since the mercantilist period. There has been resistance to the process of globalization, in its most recent incarnation against the WTO, from a number of sources including those subscribing to a nationalistic ideology.

### Regional Blocs

Regional groupings have been formed as a compromise between autarky and liberalism. They take advantage of the benefits of reduced barriers to trade, investment and labor migration through economies of scale to better compete in a world where liberalization remains incomplete. Such efforts have been successful in groupings of advanced, complex economies and not in structurally dependent areas. The prototypical regional grouping is the European Union (EU) within which barriers to the movement of goods, services and capital have been eliminated but

remain in economic dealings with non-members. Such measures seek to create a large enough internal market to take advantage of economies of scale and specialization across a broad set of products. Once again, the formation of a regional economic identity serves to undercut the initiatives of nationalists to promote a national identity. For example, a minor UK party which contests European Parliamentary elections, the UK Independence Party, argues that movement towards regional governance subverts democracy in terms of accountability (<http://www.independenceuk.org.uk/cgi/ukip.pl?id=2>). For them greater governmental accountability is attained when sovereign governance resides with the national group.

### Ethnic Subdivision

In a sense the two previous trends have worked against nationalist identification from above. Ethnic subdivision does the same from below. The key argument of activists with this viewpoint is that the national identity has been improperly constructed, or more strongly the given nation-state is unrepresentative of national identity. There are several ways for the argument to be pursued by its advocates. Beginning with the most peaceful, advanced west European nation-states contain sub-regions with groups (Scots, Welsh, Basque, Flemish, Catalan, etc.) whose ethnicity is different than the predominant group. Under pressure from the EU, the UK has responded with devolution of governance powers to the regions. Going further the EU recognizes such regions in special supportive institutions. Unfortunately, such a conciliatory response is not always to be found. If the post-Cold War period ethnic sovereignty movements have sparked destructive civil wars, most notably in the former Yugoslavia. In that country fifty years of identity constructed under Tito was insufficient to develop a stable and dominant nationalism tied to the recognized nation-state. Namely, forces seeking to redefine the state of

their primary political allegiance crushed the old paradigm. Ethno-linguistic identity so motivated individuals that many were willing to take up arms and die, if necessary, for such a cause. In a post-colonial periphery the redefinition of stateness along ethno-linguistic lines is a great threat to the stability of current nation states.

At this point it will be useful to consider what nationalism is and its development.

Nationalism remains a common explanation for the course of political events in the popular press. The ways in which the term is used is not precise. Nationalism is used interchangeably with patriotism (a euphemism), racism and ethno-centrism. *Economic* nationalism is used for protectionism.

### Nationalism Defined

*Nationalism is the ideology which holds that there are sociological and psychological forces that spring from unique cultural and historical factors to provide unity and inspiration to a given people through a sense of belonging together and of sharing values. The end of this movement is for this people to government itself in self-determined sovereignty.* A departure from religiously-derived authority over temporal affairs, nationalism claims popular legitimation. This people is labeled a nation, a self-identifying group united by affective bonds. Identification which seems to come from labeling by the out-group becomes self-identification when tacitly accepted as constituting a collectivity by its members. A nation is a group of individuals who identify themselves as part of the said collectivity (Benedict Anderson's Imagined Community). This identity is constructed. There are a number of characteristics along which cohesiveness of the in-group can be built. Among these are commonalities in regards to language, ethnicity, religion, history, and race. Clearly an individual can identify oneself as a

member of different potential groups. The question arises: How are identities selected?

This multiplicity of identities is dynamic and individually selected. It is a situational identity, adapted to the most politically salient axis of identification at that historical moment. There has been some work on how identities are constructed in the Ethnic Studies field. In considering the identity construction for the Asian American community in the United States, Lisa Lowe argues culture is not static and in that it must be transmitted to a younger generation, it will change: cultural identity is a matter of becoming as well as of being (Lowe, 64). Due to this state of flux, Lowe wishes to address the issue not from cultural identity but from cultural practices that produce identity such as racial formation. Racialized minorities continually redefine themselves to disrupt current hegemonic relationships which subordinate them. Hegemonic relationships can be instituted on a variety of identity axes; opposition to this subservient situation can promote cohesiveness to this group identity. Ling-chi Wang illustrates this situational identity in his consideration of Chinese Americans. He identifies five mentalities (used for identities) which has been typical over the past one and a half centuries. According to the historical situation, largely Sino-American relationship and the level of xenophobia, Chinese Americans have identified more strongly (emphasize) with one component or the other of that label. Two of the later categories will serve as an illustration. The *accommodators* are those who identified themselves as Chinese and pledged their loyalty to that country before return was made impossible with the 1949 regime change. It is a "survival strategy in an alien setting" (Wang, 200) which does not, as assimilation does, reject Chinese culture but adjusts to American culture in public without changing their private Chinese values. Also, there are the *ethnically proud*, an identity emerging in the 1960's in the wake of the black

power movement. These (mainly) college students sought dual liberation from domination by white racism and extraterritorial rule by the ROC. Rejecting the assimilationism of their parents, the ethnically proud fought for Asian American Studies and established organizations for justice and social services in China towns. Their identity was neither transplant of Chinese nor rejection of Chinese American. In this example, a group redefined itself to adapt to an externally-imposed incentive structure and created a new identity for the circumstance. This same phenomenon occurs for other nationalities, i.e., the historical situation is taken into account to (1) select the most politically-salient axis of identity and (2) construct an identity upon which to mobilize the group.

The next question is: Who mobilizes the group? One approach taken is that political elites are opportunists. They see politically salient issues upon which to rise to power (Horowitz 31), within the current political system or in a new one. Many national groups within multinational states, even if they lack nationally-based political institutions, have social institutions in the civil society (e.g., churches, cultural organizations). The adept politician can tap into the community through these institutions. Where civil society is suppressed and nationalities mixed even at the local level, national mobilization becomes more difficult. The grass-roots can also be a source of impetus for mobilization, i.e., led by those not occupying a formally hierarchical position. Due to inadequate resources and often education, the task for mass-mobilization is more difficult.

### **Forms of Nationalism**

Not all nationalism are the same, either in formation process or their relationship to the state. On the grounds of their formation, nationalism can be divided into two broad classes: pristine and secondary.

### Pristine Nationalism

Pristine nationalism is indigenously constructed to provide some function collectively which the then-current system is unable to provide. Such a function could be the waging of total war which requires large-scale coordination of personnel and commitment to a goal despite hardship. Mercenary armies were not able to deliver such a force as their loyalty was expensive and uncertain. Even if the advantages of invoking nationalism were readily apparent as early as the Thirty Years War in western Europe, there were a number of enabling factors absent.

The sense of nationhood (e.g., Englishness), as discussed above, was largely absent from either the cosmopolitan elite or the sedentary, isolated masses. Elites were more likely, in the west European system of inter-married nobility, to interact across political boundaries than with peasants in a Northumbrian village. This changed with the rise of capitalism and was intensified by the industrial revolution. Bendix rightly identifies patrimonialism as the dominant form of interclass relationships in premodern Europe (Bendix 33), typified by reciprocal service and duty. The advantages of capitalist wealth distribution rendered the patrimonial arrangement suboptimal for the elite. The restriction of the mass from previously enjoyed communal rights (rise of legalistic property regimes such as England's Enclosure Movement) forced many off the land as an occupation (Mandel 8). The surplus labor once uprooted went to the cities as their villages could not accommodate them.

Urbanization brought a significant group of people together for face-to-face communication which was the only readily available form due to illiteracy and the lack of long-distance audio conveyance infrastructure. In the cities, this new social phenomenon prompted calls for autonomous recognition (Bendix 43). Vested aristocratic interests in the countryside

opposed such recognition so as to retain preferential access to power. Barrington Moore (1966) provides an excellent treatment of how this relationship evolved in England/Britain, which will not be repeated here. So, capitalist disruption of patrimonial and communal relationships push former peasants to the cities; jobs created by the industrial revolution was a pull factor.

Uprooting such as this is a stage of social mobilization to be followed by the cementing of new relationships (Deutsch 494). Urbanization was creating new social forces in close proximity but also often possessing familial ties to isolated areas, but for the true potential of industrial capitalism to be felt the illiterate unskilled peasant would have to be transformed. The functional specificity of economic tasks required a division of labor. Many of these positions to be filled required semi-skilled laborers who possessed the skill of following non-personal instructions, in other words, literacy.

While educational existed in premodern times, access was severely limited. In patrimonial Europe, education was operated by the church for vocations, not literacy. As socio-economic changes necessitated the broadening of the literate labor-base, political authorities stepped in to administrate. The first decision to be made is in regards to in which language should instruction occur under state administration. Church-run institutions often used the vernacular of the locality supplemented with Latin. Language has often played a role in the institutionalization of national identity. Central governments as they sought to raise literacy in a national language, creating linguistic similarity while phasing out local dialects. In this way they manufacture a national identity and enhance state power.

Contrary to popular belief, there is no *linguistic* difference between language and dialect; language differs as it is given political recognition as a form of communication. By using the



state-sanctioned language in education (or denying the use of local dialects in schools), an incentive structure is created to encourage acquisition of national language skills. Some states have gone the further step of prohibiting the use of local dialects (especially in print); local dialects die out and are replaced by the national language. Those who then are speakers of that national language have a basis for common identity.

Once the language has been standardized, elites are able to use print media (the printing press being required) and postal services which were usually under state control. To support state communication to its isolated localities as well as trade of agricultural goods for those of the task-specified city economy, the government upgraded transportation infrastructure (in some cases called postal roads ). This in turn facilitated the movement of once-sedentary populations even more to the still-expanding urban economy. For Deutsch, these forms of transportation and communication forms transactional networks upon which relationships social mobilization can be built. Together these socio-economic developments were prerequisites for self-sustaining mass-participation. Once again, it was this mass participation which gives popular legitimacy to the ideology of nationalism.

What has been described is a typical route to national identity but not the only one. England was one of the first to follow this process, in the eighteenth century following the Glorious Revolution (Liah Greenfield makes this case). France and the United States soon made the transition. Nationalism based upon popular legitimacy, of course, does not necessarily mean democracy as participation need not equal control.

#### Secondary Nationalism: Copying the Winner

Secondary nationalism is spurred in reaction to other s forms of ideology or by conquest.

In both manifestations, the observed nationalism carries an instrumental legitimacy as it has been demonstrated as a successful model of social organization. The Napoleonic Wars invasion of Germany and Italy provided an unambiguous military defeat demonstrating the French advantages in military communications, due to the standardized French language, and fielding a conscript (*levée en masse*) citizen army driven by national sentiment. The occupation with its humiliation of the local populations which intensified both in-group solidarity and out-group hostility. The military-political outcome undermined the system of HRE statelets as they proved unable to fulfill the state's obligation of defense (Hobbes XIV, second law of nature). Furthermore, for administrative purposes the French occupation grouped the statelets into larger units which would become politically relevant post-Vienna.

A similar model has been followed in much of the developing world. Their colonial legacy in a recent history of subjugation to a foreign power, homogenization of domestic variation in the minds of the colonial elite, reinforcing dependency in economic relationship, and the arbitrary imposition of boundaries without regard to potential nationalities (Emerson 100). In much of the colonized world nationalism was late to come as the socio-economic prerequisites had not yet been met (Deutsch 507). The United Nations and other IGOs (e.g., OAU) have reinforced the non-locally-constructed borders, discouraging the redrawing of them (UNRes242). In the early process of decolonization two partitions were made of ex-British Empire territory in 1947: India and Palestine. Neither of these was able to create secure and stable nationhoods. The Palestine partition created an Arab-dominated Arab section but a Jewish section with a 40% Arab minority prior to mass immigration. Furthermore the gerrymandering of territory made the land nearly indefensible. Similarly the weakness of linkages between East and West Pakistan (in the

face of strategic inferiority) made continual union unlikely. Why did the developing countries choose a national mythology? While the factor of emulation as in the Napoleonic case was certainly operative, another explanation comes from elite decision-makers. Nehru, Ho Chi Minh and Abdullah (and many others) were all educated in the west, absorbing the European models of modernization which incorporated the forces of nationalism.

The problem with the importation of the nation-state system is to found a nation-state one must identify the nation (Emerson 95). This was especially a problem in multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-confessional societies with historically divergent regions such as Nigeria, Kenya and India. For India there were 700 dialects, seven major religions (with at least ten million adherents), over 40 ethnic groups with separate histories, two millennia-old settled races plus the usual urban versus rural, class and caste cleavages. Upon what basis should identity be constructed? Elites were strongly secular which ruled out founding a Hindu theocracy, despite 83% adherence. (Secularism was reinforced with argumentation opposing Pakistan's departure for solely reasons of religion.) Hindi an officially-sanctioned language is intelligible by one-third of the population as a first language. Many of the other dialects are derived from the same base (Sanskrit). Yet, this excludes many of the more socio-economically advanced states (subsovereign division) in the south. The language issue became salient in the mid-1990's when the Prime Minister (from Karnataka) was criticized by the opposition for speaking no Hindi. The compromise has been for the states to select languages of instruction (23 chosen) along with two federal languages Hindi (lingua franca of the north) and English (a distinctly Indian dialect of it which spoken by the elite and middle class; English is also the lingua franca of the south; nearly half of the *literate* population can use English). The larger ethnicities received administration of

states, many of them now governed by separatist parties such as AIADMK in Tamil Nadu. No single ethnicity is large enough to dominate the country by mobilization on that axis. The Indian government had no choice but to build a national mythology of history which emphasizes periodic unity. India is better suited than many developing states as UK direct rule last 90 years with commercial domination dating to 1599. Indian history texts argue an Indian identity dates to the empires of Gupta and Ashoka, which is questionable. How does the Indian case inform theory? Political commitment over the course of several generations (note the Congress Party institutions predate independence by 50 years) and a continuing administrative apparatus (Huntington 426) can seek to construct an identity lacking the traditional ascriptive characteristics. The foundations of the identity were forged in the struggle for independence from the out-group, external enemy (Emerson 110). Pakistan's attempt to pick one which to promote has been less successful in terms of unity and stability.

### **Nationalism, Capitalism and Class**

The ideology of nationalism does not dictate which form of political regime will be created but does create some opposition to capitalism. The capitalist system achieves its optimal efficiency under a competitive free trade situation. Such a system is not in the national group interest of non-dominant peoples. Capitalism seeks to break down the restrictions economic nationalists may erect to trade flows.

### Nationalism and Democracy

Nationalism and democracy both draw upon the people as its source of legitimacy. For nationalism to be compatible with any sort of substantive democracy it must be of the non-exclusionary variety which enshrines the principle of minority rights under a system of majority

rule. Too often, however, nationalist sentiment turns against minority nations and viewpoints while serving the end of dominant-group solidarity. This is really what de Tocqueville warned of as a tyranny of the majority. Nationalists can be elected (e.g., BJP in India) but if they impose extreme policies which disrupt the democratic institutions or constitutional guarantees to minorities democracy has ended. Democracy is a system of channeling conflict and encouraging compromise with which some incarnations of nationalism are incompatible. The Nazi variant of nationalism lacked respect for the Weimar institutions and targeted a minority group as the out-group. Policies were undertaken which stripped minorities of rights and drastically reconfigured the political system. That type of nationalism cannot coexist with democracy even if it enjoys popular support.

#### Nationalism and Communism: Stalin vs Trotsky

The other great ideology of this century of ideologies is communism. Communism was formed in opposition to imperialism/colonialism, a role nationalism occasionally takes. The question whether communism, once implemented, would be national or international was heavily debated in the early years of this century (Lenin 226). Eventually communism within one country was chosen (in Russia/USSR). The cynical reason for this selection is that the attempt to expand into Poland in the 1920's failed. Yet, while state boundaries remained International conferences and associations continued to promote the ideals of communism cross-nationally. There were countries which established communism upon largely indigenous initiative (China, Cuba) while others formed their regimes in response to Red Army actions (Eastern Europe). The first category was able to infuse the regime with nationalist popular legitimacy as well as the economic ideology which accompanied the doctrine. When the Soviet Union collapsed, imposed

communism regimes fell while national communists were able to adapt their ideology such that PRC has become a capitalist country ruled by communists. The non-globalist (sovereignty-surrendering) form of communism has demonstrated an ability to coexist with nationalist sentiments and even use them in furtherance of its agenda.

### Recap

Nationalism is an ideology which remains influential in the domain of states which meet the enabling prerequisites. This ideology requires the identification of a collectivity, the nation. Individuals can have numerous competing identities which are selected based upon their political salience in a given situation. Groups mobilizing along national lines seek self-determination in response to socio-economic incentives or strategic circumstances. Nationalism has a role in the shaping of political and economic regimes but does not determine them. As literacy and communication expand in areas outside of this domain which are ruled by regimes popularly viewed as inept, a new wave of national movements can be expected. The limiting factors on nationalist subdivision of existing states are in dominant-state interests for stability and a minimum size of economic viability in the absence of complete free trade of capital, goods and labor.

These are some of the fundamental forces driving the security situation in the post-Cold War world. Nationalism as in the above discussion emanates from identity and can strengthen or undermine existing state institutions and legitimacy depending on representativeness. Now it is necessary to consider some specific security implications of this identity-driven politics as considered in the literature.

The Lake and Rothchild argue that peaceful ethnic relations require minorities to be

confident in their physical and cultural security (Lake and Rothchild 2003). They argue there are steps confidence-building measures which local governments and elites can take to alleviate such fears and that ethnic conflicts are most effectively managed by the state and its institutions (Lake and Rothchild 2003). If a state is not considered the legitimate authority by an ethnic minority yet has the capability to enforce contracts, will it be effective in managing the conflict? A possible case may be the Kurdish population, a stateless community in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. The Turkish portion of it resides in a relatively strong state which deploys 30,000 troops from its modern NATO army to combat PKK terrorism. State institutions have been ineffective in managing the conflict largely due to the legitimacy issue. For Turks, Kurds are mountain Turks not a separate ethnic group and as such are included in the state's institutions including the Parliament. The Kurdish elite does not see their identity in this way. A refinement of Lake and Rothchild may be to restrict confidence in the state's role in conflict resolution to those which are viewed as legitimate by ethnic minorities. There are four key, non-exhaustive, mechanisms for building confidence: (1) demonstration of respect, (2) power sharing (3) elections and (4) regional autonomy/federalism (Lake and Rothchild 2006-12). Autonomy and federalism by creating locally-controlled institutions may facilitate additional future devolution. Power sharing can be problematic over the long-term as the then-accurate ethnic balance of power is locked in. If ethnic groups grow at different rates (population, wealth, etc), certain groups may have incentives to seek revisions in the contract, creating instability. Lake and Rothchild admit that such actions are conflict management, not conflict resolution, and can be repealed at will. In such a case, external intervention may be useful. There are three forms by which external actors can intervene (1) non-coercive intervention (norms, diplomacy, non-

military sanctions), (2) coercive intervention (peace enforcement/keeping) and (3) third-party mediation (Lake and Rothchild 214-224). For Lake and Rothchild, external actors cannot solve the underlying problems of mistrust but can halt the resort to force in such conflicts for their time of attention by raising costs (Lake and Rothchild 225). If peace-keepers stop the fighting but do not resolve the underlying issues, what will happen when they are withdrawn? Peace-keeping cannot be ordered independent of other diplomatic actions which address the underlying issues. Americans seem to get caught-up in the issue of a withdrawal timetable and exit strategy; if the US is really serious about creating peace, the timetable must be linked to events not dates. Wrangling over exiting before the forces arrive may undercut the confidence of local peoples in the commitment of external actors to seeing through the peace to its conclusion. Addressing intergroup grievances eases tension. Information failures, commitment credibility, security dilemma and political entrepreneurs in divided polities make violence always a possibility (Lake and Rothchild 226). It is nice to say: assist with information. Yet, is being unbiased necessary or possible. If the conflict is already started, I doubt local actors will believe that attempts to address information failures are unbiased and without ulterior motive.

To some the notion of universal human rights is radical as it contradicts the notion of national sovereignty (Krasner and Froats 227). It is interesting how supposed proponents of human rights adopt them selectively from the UDHR. For example, the death penalty as a judicial punishment is banned by a number of human rights protocols, yet America joins with Russia Iraq and PRC to impose that sentence on its own citizens. Minority rights can be protected in the Westphalian (state) System where specific commitments are offered by the state; by entering into multilateral accords the state signals the credibility of such commitments (Krasner



and Froats 228-9). External actors can compel certain policies regarding minorities to be implemented but it requires the continuous application of threat if internal support is lacking (Krasner and Froats 230). In considering the role of minority rights in the Westphalian system, 1945 is a water-shed year when minority rights were replaced by a universal human rights in treaties, if not in practice. Krasner and Froats attribute this change to the rise of the United States which emphasized individual rights over groups rights (Krasner and Froats 244). In 1945, the US (here, defender of human rights) had the Philippines as a formal colony, segregated by race in the military and maintained the Asian Barred Zone in migration policy. One might better characterize America as supporting individual rights (meritocracy) for a *group*. Acknowledging group rights internationally would have forced the questioning of domestic policies. This transnational linkage was made 20 years later as decolonization and the civil rights movement coincided. I would attribute this notion of human rights as a way to side-step any responsibility for oppressed groups; it also fits in well with economic liberalism. In concluding, Krasner and Froats find toleration to be the result of domestic developments which have often been reinforced by external commitments which codify such agreements, constraining the behavior of future rulers (Krasner and Froats 249). Toleration by coercion has usually failed (Krasner and Froats 249). Diplomatic recognition, a common tool for influence, has limited utility as its leverage was lost once the status was granted (Krasner and Froats 250). When there is internal support for minority toleration, international efforts provide an incentive structure to institutionalize such initiatives but cannot do so against substantial domestic opposition (Krasner and Froats 250). What Krasner and Froats have offered us is the international community can provide incentives to codify contracts but can do little on the ground. The more important

question is: How can people be convinced toleration is in their interest, if coercion will not work? I m afraid they may have to tire of fighting first, as in Bosnia. Once there is a contract, Krasner and Froats give me little confidence it can be enforced over the long term against opposition.

Lake and Rothchild identify five major conclusions (1) ethnic conflict within states, and its spread across states, is the product of strategic interactions between groups and within groups; (2) ethnic conflict does diffuse abroad, but largely to states than already contain the seeds of discord or to groups that identify with the warring parties; (3) ethnic conflicts escalate and draw in third parties; (4) the strategies of third-party actors, intended or not, can have an impact of the spread of ethnic conflict; (5) ethnic conflict can be studied as interstate conflict is (Lake and Rothchild 339-43). They recommend four actions (1) make balanced information available to all (2) assist states which are weakening in their ability to enforce ethnic contracts (3) assist in the implementation stage of conflict resolution (4) plan for the future and act rapidly and decisively (Lake and Rothchild 349-50). How are ethnic groups convinced the information is unbiased and not propaganda? If an ethnic contract does not reflect the ethnic balance of power, should the West insist on its enforcement? I agree states must be able to enforce *all contracts* (this is a major function of the state) but there must be some provision for revising the contracts. Should NATO have quickly intervened to reestablish Tito s ethnic contracts? Sometimes conflict is necessary to determine the basis contracting. Preventing extremes like genocide is another matter entirely; states should be assisted to stop it. The last two proposals are too vague to provide much additional policy guidance.

Formulating Post-Cold War Security Spending and Policy

In light of continuing ethnic conflict rooted in in-group identification, what policies are being adopted by states after the Cold War? Following an initial decline in funding after the collapse of the Soviet Union in Atlantic/European theater states, western powers have resumed significant spending especially in projection forces. In other theaters, the strategic threat of the Soviet Union played a less total role in deployments. Another event occurring soon after the end of the Cold War was the Persian Gulf War of 1991 which pitted NATO powers France, Britain and America with their Arab allies against Iraq. The coalition's campaign demonstrated the following and America's hegemonic status: (1) only America had the logistical capability to deliver and supply a multi-divisional force with air support to a non-contiguous theater, and (2) the western allies had a very significant technological advantage in command, control and intelligence. Major powers with nuclear capabilities (assuring the homeland will not be the site of inter-state conflict) have over the last decade embarked on programs to expand their power-projection capabilities. These developments have taken four major forms (1) blue water naval fleets (2) long-range strategic missiles (3) rapid reaction forces and (4) logistical support.

A blue water fleet is one which can operate beyond the range of that state's shore-based fighters and permits the delivery of military force to non-contiguous states without the need to secure friendly bases within the region. A variety of ships would fit this definition in the late twentieth century: carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates and attack submarines. The vessels can operate under nuclear or conventional power, in which case at-sea refueling capability by fleet auxiliaries is needed. These fleets strike at land-based enemy installations with aircraft and missiles, at enemy trade with anti-ship missiles and torpedoes; defensive capabilities protect the fleet and escorted ships from air, surface and submarine attack.

The United States has the largest blue water navy (by far) with 11 aircraft carriers, 27 cruisers, 52 destroyers, 27 frigates and 56 attack submarines. In addition, the USN has 11 amphibious warfare ships (LHA/LHD) which have a secondary role as aircraft carriers (<http://www.nvr.navy.mil/nvrships/sbf/fleet.htm>). US defense planning takes a fleet this size as a minimum but shows no efforts toward major expansion. The American naval construction schedule will continue to be the largest in the world simply by replacing ships as they become obsolete. The only major development of note here is the procurement of 32 new *Land-Attack* Destroyers (DD-21) with the mission of providing fire support for troops ashore (<http://dd21.crane.navy.mil/Frameset-Program.htm>).

The US has no credible challengers to its global naval dominance but in several regions substantial expansion of smaller fleets is underway. Firstly in the UK whose Royal Navy held the title before, there has been a significant reversal from the early 1980's when Thatcher's government sought to eliminate carriers from the fleet. Currently the Royal Navy has three aircraft carriers, 12 destroyers, 19 frigates, 12 attack submarines and 1 amphibious ship capable of launching and recovering fixed-wing aircraft (<http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/today/index.htm>). This fleet was designed for the Cold War mission of keeping the trans-Atlantic supply lines free of Soviet submarines. In the post-Cold War period, the Blair government's Strategic Defence Review has suggested a greater emphasis on power projection. Pursuant to this, the RN has embarked upon an expansion in such capabilities. The plan calls for the construction of new large aircraft carriers (CVF) to replace the *Invincibles*, the CVF's having twice the displacement. Twelve AAW destroyers (*Type 45*) are being designed to replace those now obsolete with a great advance in technology aboard. The

*Astute* class will bring technological parity with the US submarine fleet. Along with the carriers, the greatest expansion is in amphibious forces, seen as relatively unimportant for post-colonial Britain in the Cold War, with new LPD s and ALSL s (<http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/future/index.htm>). The Royal Navy s mission has also been modified, while retaining Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities, they must be able to project force through missiles, aircraft and the landing of ground troops on distant shores like a mini-USN.

While it may be the most significant, Britain is not the only NATO power looking for naval strength. Italy and Spain have recently added VSTOL carriers to their small fleets but continue to lack the size and auxiliary support for extended independent operations away from home waters. On the other hand, France remains a player with credible projection aspirations. Traditionally fielding force levels approaching that of the Royal Navy, France has allowed the quality of its escorts and submarines to slip in recent years. Funds were drained away to construct one ship on the *Charles de Gaulle* class, a nuclear-powered fleet aircraft carrier. This ship cost the French as much as an American *Nimitz* launching aircraft in the same conventional manner (CTOL). This class has been plagued with problems which have been widely reported in the trade press (see *Jane s Fighting Ships* 1999) but stands as the only currently operational nuclear CTOL carrier outside of the USN. The critical problem is as opposed to the British plan, France has built a part-time carrier navy. The estimate given by the USN and RN is that for a navy to maintain one carrier on station it needs three: one on-station, one in refit and one working-up for deployment. To create a part-time carrier navy, France has weakened the remainder of that service. Whatever the errors in planning, the clear intention of the French is power projection.

Beyond the Atlantic-European theater programs of naval expansion have been launched

by India and China to the gratification of Russia's shipyards. China perhaps paid closer attention than anyone to the verdict of the Persian Gulf War smashing the lingering paradigm of Mao Zedong's people's war (Waldron 135). The Chinese military was vast but obsolete with aging Soviet weaponry and indigenous knock-offs, when their equivalent tactics and equipment were demonstrated as insufficient in the Middle East. The most obvious shortcoming in Chinese force structure is the People's Liberation Army (Navy) which has numerous brown water (coastal) combatants, many of them missile-armed, which operate under the protective cover of land-based air. This forms a significant defensive force but lacks the projection capacity to take Taiwan by force. Among other Asian states, Japan, India, Korea and Taiwan have equivalent or larger blue water navies. The current surface fleet has only 3 destroyers and 3 frigates of modern types (Waldron 138). Chinese lack of training which plagues all of its armed forces continues to impede taking full advantage of procurement spending. However, China has embarked upon a program of naval expansion to establish itself as a regional power. For this, China has put Russia's dormant shipyards to work procuring destroyers and *Kilo* class diesel submarines capable of blue water operations (Waldron 134). The latter could be used to deny Taiwanese access to shipping lanes for needed resupply during a prolonged siege and complicate American supporting operations. Serious conversation continues about the acquisition of an operational aircraft carrier (Waldron 138), perhaps based upon the ex-British *Melbourne* or ex-Russian *Minsk* both of which are in Chinese possession. What can be said without speculation is that the Chinese authorities have launched modernization efforts to expand the potential sphere of influence.

The last naval program of note here is India's. India has the most powerful third world

navy with two aircraft carriers, 18 diesel attack submarines, 7 destroyers, and 11 frigates. Most of these ships were built by Russia and the UK. Sanctioned for construction are two carriers to replace those being retired, 5 nuclear attack subs (based upon the Russian *Charlie-I*), 13 diesel attack subs, another *Type 15 Delhi* class destroyer, and 21 frigates. While this program would increase the size of the fleet, that may not be the most important aspect. Much of the Indian fleet has traditionally been purchased second-hand; the naval expansion seeks to procure new ships many of which will be built domestically. For example the two carriers currently in the fleet are ex-Royal Navy and quite old. The *Virrant* (ex-*Hermes*) was commissioned in 1959 and served through the Falklands War; India bought it in 1986. *Vikrant* was purchased incomplete in 1957 and served 40 years for the Indian Navy, operating *Alize* propeller planes until 1989. The first major surface combatant designed and procured indigenously is the *Delhi* class destroyer of which three are planned with an option for three more (<http://www.uss-salem.org/worldnav/asiapac/india.htm>). The Indian Navy claims this ship is a technological match for most of those in first world inventories, and a substantial advance over neighboring fleets. Of the two carriers, sanctioned for commission one is the Russian *Gorshkov*, built in the late 1980's, and the other is to be a domestically built *Air Defence Ship* which will operate navalized MiG-29's and Indian LCA s. This program of indigenization is occurring throughout the Indian armed services to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers for spares and training.

The second trend in expansion of force projection capabilities is the development of long-range ballistic missiles. Such missiles are so expensive to operate per kilogram lifted that their only practical use is the strategic delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The CIA

identifies nine countries developing such delivery systems technology and China, Russia and North Korea supplying it (CIA). Of the states mentioned above pursuing major naval means of power projection, all of the have developed nuclear weapons and all except India have intercontinental delivery systems. There are three major delivery systems platforms: land-based (silo or tractor-erector), submarine-based and air-based. America and Russia operate the full triad for strategic weapons. Britain uses only sea-launched ballistic missiles (Trident) from its *Vanguard* class SSBN s. France uses less-capable submarines and land-based IRBM s. China has many IRBM s which can reach Russia and regional neighbors, a small (but growing) number of ICBM s which can target the US west coast, and is attempting to develop a credible submarine system. India, the newest key player in this game, appears to be seeking the full triad, long-term. However, only land-based IRBM s which can target Pakistan and most of China are in a deployable state. Due to the global reach of American weapons, it is unlikely these weapons will be of much use other than deterrence (including deterring American interventionism).

Thirdly, the Yugoslavian break-up signaled the need for and lack of rapid reaction forces. A legacy of the Cold War was the training and deployment of vast armored forces to combat similar equipment and tactics. Such forces, given sufficient lead-time, worked well enough in the Battle of Khafji on open desert and an optimal climate for air support. Key decision-makers however have realized that very rarely will an enemy permit an uncontested six month build-up of forces in an adjacent territory. The second realization came from the Yugoslavian civil war in mountainous Bosnia. Tactics may be climate and topography-specific; small-scale infantry and irregular units can do disproportionate damage to armor and air power is relatively less effective than in Iraq. In addition, the unlimited nature and fast pace of the conflict in Bosnia required



action, if it was to be successful, immediately. The solution was the notion of a rapid reaction force of highly-trained air-mobile infantry with prepositioned or forward-deployed supporting units. Kosovo demonstrated while the US 82nd Airborne has some of these features; European states lacked the capability. In 1999, having not achieved such a force, an Anglo-French communique recommitted states of the EU to develop such unit separate from American military and political constraints. Sea-mobile units (marines) of the US, UK and France have a tradition of small-scale intervention in a similar matter. Recently, China and India have sought to enhance marine units as part of their naval expansion (outlined above).

Finally, the size of world merchant fleets needs to be mentioned. The way merchant fleets have been administered has changed significantly over the past half-century. Prior to then, fleets were flagged according to their ownership and control. From a high-point of 80% in 1815 the British (RMS) ensign covered the most ships until eclipsed by the *Liberty* ship program of WWII. During these times, Britain and America also led in ship-building now dominated by Japan and Korea. In the Cold War period however a regime of flag of convenience took over in which countries with lower taxes and labor restrictions register the ships. The leading merchant fleets fly under the flags of Bahama (26m), Greece (25m), Liberia (60m) and Panama (98m) (CIA Factbook 1999) but are owned by shipping lines headquartered in the US, UK, Germany, Norway and Japan. Quite simply, merchant fleets are necessary to supply home war industries and forces deployed abroad with a reserve to absorb attrition in conflict. Currently the US 11m DWT, France 2m, China 17m and India 7m. The UK has undergone an interesting change in 1999. During that summer, the UK reduced taxes for registration of merchant fleets in that country prompting major shipping lines to transfer registrations. Within one week the UK-

flagged merchant fleet grew from 2m DWT to 23m. The US has a civil merchant marine policy under which ships register themselves for use in wartime. Britain, China and America have acquired a wartime capability (with seizing of private ships) to sustain forces abroad.

#### Explanations for these policies

In each of these aspects, major powers are expanding their capabilities for power projection. Why are they doing this? In each of these five cases, security-based (balance) explanations are unable to explain post-war policies adopted. Firstly, the United States ended the Cold War with a vast superiority in security capability against which all others are measured. However during the 2000 presidential campaign, major Republican candidates have called for rebuilding the American military ; even the Democrat Al Gore has called for an increase in the defense budget. While some of this funding targets personnel and retention, procurement and force size expansion are to be funded along with ABM (specifics are lacking). The US is enhancing its military capability in a time when security threats have diminished and the US military enjoys a *very* comfortable margin of superiority. Furthermore this occurs at a time when Federal spending is being reduced as a share of the GDP. Why is America sacrificing transfer payments and tax reduction to fund an over-kill military? More directly, the question is what has created a political opportunity structure that could conceivably reward such policy and budgetary positions? Security based explanations would predict that as credible potential threats decline this trend would not induce defense expansion by the hegemon. (The specific program of ABM, a small part of proposed increases, may be driven by rogue state WMD threats.) In fact, British defense spending after the Anglo-Dutch War, Seven Year s War, Napoleonic War and WWI contracted during its hegemonic reign. An alternative explanation is that the target of this

budgetary signaling is a domestic audience. Specifically, the objective is the enhancement or re-emphasization of national prestige. There are many divisions in American society, potentially requiring massive resource transfers, which can be neglected if a national mission is elevated to saliency. The US military serves as a key unifying national symbol.

The UK and France are in a similar position. Both were key allies in the Cold War victory. They reduced defense spending more drastically than the US but less than other NATO states. Being nuclear powers with secure second-strike deterrents and non-contiguous to likely adversaries, credible security threats are negligible. The emphasis has been placed on developing projection forces so that these powers will be able to 'pull their own weight' in future operations, depending less upon US decision-making and commitment. Specific projections, mentioned above, are quite frankly ostentatious with the objective of showing the flag for diplomatic and political signaling. This is occurring at a point in time when EU institutions are encouraging the dual-tracks of devolution and regionalism. The military is one of the few institutions thus far remaining in the sovereign national domain. As in America it can serve as a symbol to a potentially divided nation. Out-of-area operations for peace keeping for example are dependent upon power projection and general logistical capabilities. These operations allow former great powers to demonstrate an involvement in the world disproportionately larger than their population, arsenal or economy may indicate. National prestige lies behind the procurement policies for Britain and France.

China and India's non-nuclear policies to enhance power projection are also not driven by security concerns. For Waldron, China is seeking out a 'place in the sun'. Both countries are seeking a status accorded to those states which have dominated them over the past centuries.

Both states also have long histories over which to find a territorial expanse greater than currently within their borders. For China this includes Taiwan as an integral part of the Chinese state. India's military programs (carrier, SSN, nukes) are driven primarily by prestige--creating the trappings of a great power. They want to be a Security Council permanent member, as their former colonizer Britain is. For both it is an issue of respect by advanced countries and revanchism. As the other heterogenous countries in this study, the military as a symbol of national power can be used to unify the citizenry to neglect other issues. For example India's weaponization program of 1998, garnered strong support for BJP policy by both Hindus and Muslims.

Jaswant Singh, an Indian MP and member of the BJP which campaigned on open nuclear testing, explains to a Western audience why India conducted nuclear tests in 1998. He argues that India, which is not party to NPT or CTBT, has continued its long-standing policy in light of a nuclear world selecting between the choices of global disarmament or the exercise of the principle of equal and legitimate security for all (Singh 42), that is, become a nuclear weapons state. He characterizes past Indian nuclear policy as moralistic with little benefit, while the BJP policy is security-driven. It is also realistic: Nuclear weapons remain a key indicator of state power (Singh 44) He catalogs the past diplomatic efforts India has made on the non-use and elimination of the weapons which have been rebuffed by the nuclear-haves (Singh 44). Singh emphasizes in weaponizing overtly India broke no treaty obligations but Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation violated the NPT, making it a dead letter in South Asia, leaving it no choice (Singh 44). National interest supported by a consensus made the decision (Singh 46). Between two nuclear weapons states, in a world in which nuclear deterrence covers all but Africa and southern

Asia, India filled a vacuum to defend its own security.

Immediately after the nuclear tests last year, the Indian government made this same case--the security environment, especially a perceived American tilt toward the PRC, necessitated weaponization---and received enthusiastic support from its citizenry in the form of rallies and op-eds. In his discussion of the global nuclear situation, Singh mentions that much of the world is covered by nuclear guarantees and that India is not but does not mention any diplomatic attempts to enter into an extended deterrence agreement. If external balancing is not a desirable policy, he needs to explain why developing an indigenous capability is more beneficial to security. Furthermore, what good are nuclear warheads if adequate delivery systems have not been fielded. Currently there are no ICBMs, no SSBNs, the *Agni* and *Prithvi* IRBMs are inaccurate; only tactical aircraft (FGAs) can be reliably used as delivery vehicles. The stated deterrent target of weaponization was the PRC, yet India has not developed a way to deliver warheads to vital targets (on East and South China Seas); weaponization is not a credible threat to the PRC but may be directed as a deterrent to Pakistan. There is, however, another way of looking at it: tactical use. What has been produced are relatively warheads, with such weapons the costs of nuclear warfare are *contestable*. Nuking an armored column with MiG-29s may be contemplated. Weaponization has a dual purpose: tactical use against a Chinese invasion and deterring Pakistani first-use.

The BJP played this one right. In October 1999 they received a new mandate from the Indian electorate which strongly supported (1) standing up to western-imposed norms and (2) enhancing influence-projection capabilities. As the practical use of nuclear weapons is limited, flashy but conventional arms are being funded as enumerated above with the SSN initiative

prioritized among naval requests.

### Conclusion

As the predominance of ideology as the rubric along which states formed alliances and policies, identity-based political tactics are resurging. Among the strong nuclearized states considered in this study all are enhancing their power projection capabilities and thereby prestige as perceived by the domestic audience. Political elites are rediscovering nationalism as a motivating force for bonding constituencies to them. I would expect this to hold among established states with a credible nuclear deterrent. As always more study is needed to test in other cases. Ideally in several years when the policies specified above are implemented, or not funded, the motivations for such decisions will be re-examined.

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